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When Does Organized Protest
Activity Violate the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act?
by Ralph C. Anzivino
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 175-181. © 2002 American Bar Association.
This is a civil Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) case. A RICO case requires
a pattern of racketeering activity. In
this case, the pattern of racketeer-
ing activity is alleged to be orga-
nized acts of "extortion" in violation
of the Hobbs Act, and state extor-
tion law. The H~bbs Act defines
extortion to mean "the obtaining of
property from another, with his con-
sent, induced by the wrongful use
of actual or threatened force, vio-
lence or fear. ..." 18 U.S.C. §
1951(b)(2) (emphasis added). The
jury found that the protesters' con-
duct at various abortion clinics con-
stituted "extortion." The district
court awarded treble damages and
issued an injunction against any fur-
ther wrongful conduct.
ISSUE
Did the protesters' organized con-
duct at the abortion clinics consti-
tute "extortion" under federal and
state law?
Ralph C. Anzivino is a professor of
law at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wis.,
Rcanzivino@aol.com
or (414) 288-7094
Does RICO authorize the federal
courts to issue an injunction at the
behest of a private party?
FACTS
Petitioners are organizations and
individuals who oppose abortion.
Respondents are an organization
that supports the legal availability of
abortion and two clinics that per-
form abortions. In 1986, respon-
dents initiated this lawsuit in the
United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois against
the petitioners. In their amended
complaint, respondents asserted
claims on behalf of two putative
nationwide classes: all women's
health centers at which abortions
are performed, and women whose
freedom to use the services of
such abortion clinics has been or
will be interfered with by any
unlawful activities of petitioners.
Respondents alleged violations of
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the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1),
RICO (18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968), and
state law.
In their RICO claims, respondents
alleged that petitioners had formed
a loose association-in-fact of individ-
uals and groups known as the Pro-
Life Action Network (PLAN), united
by a common ideological purpose of
opposing abortion. They further
alleged that PLAN was a RICO
"enterprise." Respondents claimed
that petitioners, by engaging in
protests aimed at disrupting and
closing abortion clinics, had directly
or indirectly participated in the
conduct of PLAN's activities through
a "pattern" of "racketeering activi-
ty" in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1962(c). The pattern of racketeering
activity allegedly included acts of
''extortion" in violation of the Hobbs
Act and state extortion law.
Specifically, respondents accused
petitioners of having engaged in
extortion by wrongfully using actual
or threatened force, violence, or
fear to "obtain" respondents "prop-
erty," by inducing doctors and clinic
employees to leave their jobs and by
discouraging and obstructing puta-
tive patients from obtaining abor-
tions. Respondents also alleged a
conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act
and state law.
After motions, the district court dis-
missed the complaint, National
Organization of Women v.
Scheidler, 765 F.Supp. 937 (N.D.II1.
1991), for failure to state a valid
claim and the Seventh Circuit
affirmed. National Organization of
Women v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612
(7th Cir. 1992). The Seventh Circuit
held that RICO does not apply
to defendants who commit "non-
economic crimes in furtherance of
noneconomic motives." The
Supreme Court reversed the
Seventh Circuit, and held that RICO
contains no economic motive
requirement. National
Organization of Women v.
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
Following the Supreme Court's deci-
sion, respondents filed an amended
complaint and requested injunctive
relief. After motions, the trial court
dismissed various claims, but the
RICO claims were ordered for trial.
National Organization of Women v.
Scheidler, 897 F.Supp 1047 (N.D.Ill.
1995).
The case was tried from March 2 to
April 20, 1998. Evidence was pre-
sented concerning numerous inci-
dents spanning the nationwide con-
duct of abortion protesters over a
15-year period. The jury returned a
verdict for respondents on their
claim under RICO section 1962(c).
The jury found that petitioners had
"associated with PLAN" and com-
mitted 21 acts or threats involving
extortion against a patient, prospec-
tive patient, doctor, nurse, or clinic
employee in violation of the Hobbs
Act. The jury also found 25 viola-
tions of state extortion law (defined
the same way as Hobbs Act extor-
tion), which qualified as predicate
acts under RICO; 25 attempts or
conspiracies to violate federal or
state extortion law; four acts or
threats of physical violence to any
person or property in violation of
the Hobbs Act; 23 violations of the
Travel Act, which proscribes travel
across state lines or the use of the
mail or telephone with the intent to
commit extortion under the Hobbs
Act or state law; and 23 attempts to
violate the Travel Act. The jury
awarded damages to both respon-
dent clinics. Pursuant to RICO, the
damages were trebled.
Thereafter, on July 28, 1999, the
district court entered a broad
nationwide injunction regulating
petitioners' future protest activities
at clinics. National Organization of
Women v. Scheidler, 1999 WL
571010 (N.D. Ill. 1999). On appeal,
a panel of the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's findings.
The panel also held that injunctive
relief is available to private litigants
under RICO. National Organization
of Women v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687
(7th Cir. 2001). In so holding, the
court disagreed with the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Religious Tech.
Ctr. V Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076
(9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1103 (1987). The Supreme
Court granted the writ of certiorari
on April 22, 2002. National
Organization of Women v.
Scheidler, 122 S.Ct. 1604 (2002).
CASE ANALYSIS
Initially, petitioners assert that
RICO was not created to address
political-protest activity. RICO
requires proof of a "pattern of rack-
eteering activity." A "pattern of
racketeering activity" requires at
least two acts of racketeering. The
necessary acts of racketeering must
come from RICO's definition of
"racketeering activity." RICO lists
the specific offenses that qualify as
predicate acts.
Not every crime qualifies as a predi-
cate offense supporting a RICO
claim. For example, the list of predi-
cate crimes does not include tres-
pass, disorderly conduct, obstruc-
tion of public passages, vandalism,
harassment, resisting arrest, con-
tempt of court, assault, battery, or
even rioting. In other words, RICO
excludes from its coverage precisely
those offenses most likely to arise in
the context of political or social
protests. This is not a coincidence.
Congress adopted an enumerated
list of predicate offenses in response
to concerns that RICO, if drafted
more generally, could be used as a
weapon against protesters who
engaged in unlawful demonstration
activity. Petitioners maintain that
under the Seventh Circuit's
approach, virtually any unlawful
activity designed to change one's
conduct could be extortion. They
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contend that this erroneous view of
extortion would sweep within its
definition any protest activity that
crosses the line from legal to illegal
activity.
Petitioners maintain that, faced with
a statute that was not designed for
use against protesters, respondents
sought to shoehorn this case into
RICO on the theory that coercive
protesting is a form of "extortion."
This is a distortion of the doctrine
of "extortion" under federal and
state law. The Hobbs Act prohibits
interference with commerce by
"extortion." The Hobbs Act defines
extortion as "the obtaining of prop-
erty from another, with his consent,
induced by the wrongful use of actu-
al or threatened force, violence, or
fear, under color of official right." A
claim of Hobbs Act extortion fails if
any of the statutory elements is
lacking. Petitioners are convinced
that respondents have failed to
allege or prove the "obtaining" of
"property," and "wrongful" use of
actual or threatened force, violence
or fear.
Extortion under the Hobbs Act and
state law requires the "obtaining" of
property from another. Petitioners
maintain that the "obtaining" of
property requires the acquisition of,
and not mere interference with or
injury to, property. It is elementary
that words in a statute are normally
given their ordinary meaning. The
dictionary defines obtain to mean,
"to come into the possession or
enjoyment of ... to acquire or get."
The dictionary further provides that
obtain is not synonymous with
"part with" or "to let go, give up, or
surrender." The plain meaning of
obtaining thus includes more than
merely making someone lose or give
up something. The extortionate
"obtaining" requires not only that a
victim be deprived of property but
also that someone gets the property
as a result of the deprivation.
Similarly, petitioners further main-
tain that respondents have failed to
distinguish between "coercion" and
"extortion." Coercion is not a predi-
cate act under RICO. Coercion is
the criminal compulsion of another
by means of threats to do or not do
something. Coercion is a creature of
statute and is much broader than
extortion. Extortion, by contrast, is
limited to the obtaining of property
by means of threat. Petitioners
maintain that the political protest-
ers' conduct is, at best, coercion,
but in no event is extortion.
Therefore, there is no predicate act
as required by RICO.
Petitioner further asserts that there
is no "property" that has been
extorted in this case. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly distinguished
between "property," on the one
hand, and "intangible rights," on the
other, when construing the "obtain-
ing property" element of federal
criminal statutes. Hobbs Act extor-
tion requires the obtaining of "prop-
erty." Clearly, petitioners did not
obtain any tangible property of
respondents. Nor did petitioners
obtain any intangible property.
Intangible rights-such as the "right
to an abortion" or the "right to per-
form abortion services"-are not
the same as intangible property. A
liberty interest such as the "right to
provide services" or the "right to
make business decisions" is an
interest too ethereal to be consid-
ered "property." Any unlawful con-
duct, whether a tort, a breach of
contract, or even a parking viola-
tion, will interfere to some degree
with another person's liberty. But
the Hobbs Act forbids the wrongful
obtaining of "property," which is
extortion, not the wrongful denial of
liberty, which is coercion. To treat
"'rights" as "property" under the
Hobbs Act would be to remove all
limits whatsoever on the kind of
injury necessary for federal extor-
tion. Such intangible liberty inter-
ests should not be equated with
"property" under the Hobbs Act.
Petitioners also maintain that there
has been no "wrongful" conduct
under the Hobbs Act. Hobbs Act
extortion requires the "wrongful"
use of actual or threatened force,
violence, or fear. The "wrongful-
ness" in question is the wrongful-
ness of the goal or purpose of the
conduct, not the wrongfulness of the
means. In the present case, petition-
ers' objective was to stop abortion.
This is a legitimate objective even if
some of petitioners' means were
unlawful. Whether one agrees or
disagrees with the goal of preventing
abortion, that goal is proper and
reasonable. Hence, the "wrongful-
ness" element is lacking.
Petitioners believe that the
Seventh Circuit's interpretation of
"extortion" contradicts several well-
established norms of statutory con-
struction. First, legislation ought not
to be interpreted in a manner that
raises constitutional difficulties. The
right to free speech shelters a broad
range of expressive activity, includ-
ing that which many people might
find offensive, coercive, and disrup-
tive. To apply the Hobbs Act to cov-
er social-protest activities would
raise serious First Amendment and
due process difficulties.
Second, the post hoc categorization
of traditional protest methods as
''extortionate" poses due process
issues of unfair surprise. No state or
federal criminal-extortion charges
were brought for any of the dozens
of supposedly "extortionate" sit-ins
or other acts on which the RICO
claim was based. It is unlikely that
if Congress had indeed wrought
such a major expansion of criminal
jurisdiction in enacting the Hobbs
Act, its action would have so long
passed unobserved. To expand the
Hobbs Act in this startling fashion
(Continued on Page 178)
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and to make the post hoc expansion
the basis for liability under RICO
raises very serious due process
concerns.
Third, the Supreme Court should be
loath to interpret federal statutes in
ways that upset the usual constitu-
tional balance of federal and state
powers. This rule militates against
turning the Hobbs Act into a device
for federalizing such traditional
state offenses as trespass, vandal-
ism, and obstruction of public pas-
sage. Finally, any uncertainty con-
cerning the ambit of criminal
statutes 'should be resolved in favor
of lenity. ThIe Supreme Court has
often stated that when there are two
rational readings of a criminal
statute, one harsher than the other,
we are to choose the harsher only
when Congress has spoken in clear
and definite language. This rule
serves to promote fair notice to
those subject to the criminal laws,
to minimize the risk of selective or
arbitrary enforcement, and to main-
tain the proper balance between
Congress, prosecutors, and courts.
As a criminal law, the Hobbs Act
is subject to this rule of strict
construction.
Petitioners argue that RICO does
not authorize injunctive relief for
private parties. The remedies provi-
sion of RICO contains three subsec-
tions addressing civil relief. None
gives injunctive relief to private par-
ties. Subsection (a) confers jurisdic-
tion upon the district courts and
authorizes broad equitable reme-
dies. Subsection (b) authorizes the
U.S. Attorney General to "institute
proceedings under this section."
Subsection (c) specifies that "any
person injured in his business or
property ... may sue therefore ...
and shall recover threefold the dam-
ages he sustains. ...." Unlike subsec-
tion (b), there is no blanket autho-
rization in subsection (c) to "insti-
tute proceedings." Instead, using
different language, the provision
specifies a right to sue and a reme-
dy, namely, treble damages. Where
Congress includes particular lan-
guage in one section of a statute but
omits it in another section of the
same statute, it is generally pre-
sumed that Congress has acted
intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion.
Had Congress intended to confer on
private parties an unqualified right
to "institute proceedings," then it
presumably would have done so
expressly as it did in the immediate-
ly preceding subsection.
Petitioners further maintain that the
conclusion that private parties can-
not obtain injunctive relief under
RICO is confirmed by reference to
the antitrust model from which
Congress borrowed the remedial
provisions of RICO. In drafting
RICO, Congress borrowed the iden-
tical remedial language from the
Sherman Antitrust statute that the
Supreme Court has held does not
authorize private injunctive relief.
Further, Congress declined to bor-
row a separate provision of antitrust
law that expressly confers private
injunctive relief. Clearly, Congress
did not intend to authorize private
injunctive relief under RICO.
Finally, the legislative history of
RICO supports the conclusion that
private injunctive relief is not avail-
able under RICO. RICO was enacted
as Title IX of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970. The Senate,
which passed the legislation first,
did not provide for private party
suits under RICO. The civil reme-
dies in the bill passed by the Senate
were limited to injunctive actions
by the United States. The "private
treble-damages action" was added
later in the House of Represen-
tatives. The Senate then adopted
the bill as amended in the House.
The "private treble-damages action"
was added as a supplement to feder-
al government enforcement of the
statute and as a remedy for those
wronged by organized crime. The
selection of a treble-damages reme-
dy, and only a treble-damages reme-
dy, was plainly a deliberate choice
by Congress.
That Congress deliberately limited
private civil relief to treble damages
appears even more clearly from the
rejection by Congress of proposals
to authorize private injunctive
relief. In considering civil RICO,
Congress was repeatedly presented
with the opportunity to expressly
include a provision permitting pri-
vate plaintiffs to secure injunctive
relief. On each occasion, Congress
rejected the addition of any such
provision. Where Congress includes
certain language in an earlier ver-
sion of a bill but deletes it prior to
enactment, it may be presumed that
the omitted text was not intended.
Respondents assert that petitioners
committed Hobbs Act extortion by
wrongfully using force and violence
to make respondents surrender
their property to petitioners. In
respondents' opinion, the object of
petitioners' extortion was to over-
ride the clinics' lawful decisions
about the use of their business
assets, including buildings, equip-
ment, and personnel, and the
patients' rights to the benefits of
their fee-for-service contracts with
medical providers. According to
respondents, the petitioners
attempted to obtain control over
these valuable assets by actual or
threatened "blitzes," which regular-
ly included physical assaults and
batteries on doctors, staff, and
patients, and such other force as
was necessary, coupled with express
or implied demands that medical
center operators shut down their
businesses. In respondents' opinion,
petitioners both obtained and
attempted to obtain respondents'
property, and petitioners' wrongful
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acts fell comfortably within the
Hobbs Act's definition of extortion.
As an initial matter, respondents
maintain that petitioners exercised
control over respondents' "proper-
ty." Property includes control over
the use and disposition of one's
resources, including business assets,
money, and valid contracts.
"Property" historically has encom-
passed the right to control one's
assets. Hobbs Act "property" is not
limited as petitioners argue.
Petitioners' narrow view is flatly
contradicted by the long-settled
meaning of property. The constella-
tion of rights that makes up proper-
ty is often analogized to a "bundle
of sticks." At the center of the bun-
dle, as Blackstone taught centuries
ago, are rights to exclusive con-
trol-the rights to the free use,
enjoyment, and disposal by a person
of all his or her acquisitions, with-
out any control or diminution, save
only by the laws of the land. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly
embraced this foundational concept
that dominion over the use and dis-
position of a thing is the essence of
"property." For example, the
Supreme Court has held that the
exclusive "right to decide how to
use" confidential business informa-
tion while intangible is "property."
Similarly, the interests respondents
are protecting in this case are
"'property."
The Hobbs Act's origins show prop-
erty includes the right to control
both tangible and intangible assets.
The Act's legislative history shows
that Congress intended to adopt the
common-law understanding that
"property" includes the intangible
right to control the lawful use and
disposition of one's assets. It is clear
that Congress relied on New York
extortion law in drafting an act con-
sistent with state law. When the
Hobbs Act was being debated, the
great weight of state extortion law,
including New York's, defined prop-
erty to include intangibles. New
York's highest court had expressly
endorsed Blackstone's view that
"property consists in the free use,
enjoyment, and disposal of all the
owner's acquisitions, without any
control or diminution, save only by
the laws of the land." Further, the
state extortion statute used the
term "property" in its most broad
and unrestricted sense to include
both tangible and intangible proper-
ty. Medical centers are businesses,
and the use of force or threats to
make them close or restrict their
services is extortion, as it would be
if directed against any other lawful
business. A woman's exclusive right
to spend her money on lawful med-
ical services, and to enter into fee-
for-services contracts with business-
es of her choice are "property" over
which petitioners may not seek
wrongfully to exercise control.
Respondents assert that one
"obtains" property under the Hobbs
Act by acquiring control over such
property. Contrary to petitioners'
assertion, Hobbs Act extortion does
not depend on having a direct bene-
fit conferred on the person who
"obtains" the property. Loss to the
victim is the gravamen of extortion.
Although most extortionists
undoubtedly seek a direct and tangi-
ble economic benefit, some extor-
tionists may be motivated by other
reasons. In any event, the essence
of extortion is the wrongful exercise
of control over another's property,
not the motivation for the aggres-
sor's conduct. The "obtaining" is
complete once the extortionist uses
wrongful conduct designed to gain
control.
Respondents maintain that petition-
ers' conduct was "wrongful" under
the Hobbs Act. The Act gives no
license for extortion that advances
personal moral codes. There is no
exception to the Hobbs Act permit-
ting extortion for a religious purpose
or a social cause. A crime is a
crime, no matter the reason for
committing it. Extortionists may
always cite some benign or even
laudable goal for their crime-to
pay for a child's education, to obtain
customers, to further political or
social ends-but no goal justifies
acts or threats of force to make oth-
ers surrender lawful property.
Racketeering harms the economy
regardless of the perpetrators'
motives. The text, history, and pur-
pose of the Hobbs Act, like RICO,
make clear that one gets no immu-
nity for wrongful conduct by citing a
legitimate goal.
Respondents further assert that
even without the Hobbs Act predi-
cate, the judgment is fully support-
ed because the jury found 25 state-
law extortion predicates. "Generic"
extortion is obtaining something of
value from another with his consent
that is induced by the wrongful use
of force, fear, or threats. State laws
criminalizing such conduct "generi-
cally" are viewed as extortion
statutes, regardless of the scope of
Hobbs Act extortion. Because peti-
tioners' conduct involved using acts
and threats of force to obtain con-
trol over respondents' business deci-
sions, it "generically" constituted
extortion.
Regarding the issuance of the
nationwide injunction, respondents
believe that RICO expressly autho-
rizes injunctive relief for private
parties. Statutory interpretation
begins with a statute's language, and
if that language is unambiguous, it
ends there. Section 1964(a) unam-
biguously gives district courts broad
power to remedy RICO violations,
including the power "to prevent and
restrain violations" and to impose
reasonable restrictions on the future
activities of violators. Section
1964(a) does not address standing.
(Continued on Page 180)
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Standing is conferred under §
1964(b) for the United States and
under § 1964(c) for private parties
whose business or property is
injured by RICO violations. Nothing
in either § 1964(b) or § 1964(c)
precludes the United States or pri-
vate parties from seeking equitable
remedies under § 1964(a). By giving
private plaintiffs standing, § 1964(c)
creates a gateway for them to seek
appropriate remedies, including
injunctions.
Similarly, § 1964(c) does not indi-
cate that treble damages are a pri-
vate plaintiff's exclusive remedy.
As the Seventh Circuit reasoned,
because the government's authority
to seek permanent injunctions
stems from the combination of
the grant of a right of action in
§ 1964(b) and the grant of authority
for courts to enter injunctions in
§ 1964(a), there is no reason not to
conclude, by parity of reasoning,
that private parties can also seek
injunctions under the combination
of grants in sections 1964(a) and
(c). Petitioners claim that because
§ 1964(b) says the Attorney General
"may institute proceedings" while
§ 1964(c) says private plaintiffs
"may sue," only the Attorney
General can seek permanent injunc-
tive relief. This conclusion does not
follow. These phrases are "equiva-
lent" and both allow parties with
standing to use § 1964(a) to seek
injunction.
Contrary to petitioners' assertions,
any analogy to the Sherman Act
does not establish that the courts
are without authority to issue an
injunction under RICO. Petitioners
argue that the courts have interpret-
ed the Sherman Antitrust Act's
treble-damages provision as preclud-
ing private injunctive relief, and
since RICO has a similar treble-
damages provision, private injunc-
tive relief should also be precluded
under RICO. Respondents note,
however, that the Supreme Court
has rejected the antitrust analogy
when analyzing RICO. The antitrust
laws provide no meaningful guid-
ance because the language and
structure of the antitrust laws signif-
icantly differ from those of RICO.
Similarly, RICO's legislative history
does not evidence any intent to pre-
clude the courts from issuing an
injunction in favor of a private liti-
gant. Petitioners suggest that
because Congress did not enact a
proposal that would have separately
provided for private injunctions, the
broad statutory grant of equitable
power in § 1964(a) should be
restricted to the government. This
argument is based on the erroneous
notion that Congress was repeatedly
presented with the opportunity to
permit private plaintiffs to seek
injunctions and repeatedly rejected
it. In fact, Congress never rejected
such a provision. There is nothing
in the legislative history of RICO
that in any way limits the authority
of courts to issue an injunction in
favor of a private litigant.
In fact, respondents assert that pri-
vate injunctions actually serve
RICO's express purposes and poli-
cies. One express purpose of RICO
is to eradicate crime in the United
States by establishing new penal
provisions and by providing
enhanced sanctions and new reme-
dies to deal with the unlawful activi-
ties of those engaged in organized
crime. Congress created RICO's civil
remedies to encourage private plain-
tiffs "to fill prosecutorial gaps," and
to turn victims "into prosecutors,
private attorneys general, dedicated
to eliminating racketeering activity."
Since government suits are brought
to address harms to private parties,
no satisfactory explanation can be
offered as to why Congress would
have precluded victims from seeking
help themselves. In addition,
where racketeers who injure private
businesses are judgment proof, as
petitioners claim to be, the threat
of damages alone has no deterrent
effect. Thus, private injunctive
relief is essential to effectuate
RICO's purpose.
Finally, contrary to petitioners'
claim, the application of RICO to
petitioners' pattern of wrongful
threats, force, and violence will not
chill lawful protest. The imposition
of RICO liability on those who use
acts and threats of force and vio-
lence to compel their victims to
surrender valuable uses of their
property does not chill lawful
protest activity. It only chills thug-
gery. Injunctions must be tailored so
as not to infringe protected speech
or conduct. Harm caused by pro-
tected speech or conduct cannot
serve as a basis for liability. Only
unprotected conduct, including
wrongful threats, should be consid-
ered. Also, crimes committed by a
member of a group may not be
imputed to the group or its leaders
unless specifically intended, and
authorized or ratified, by those
sought to be held responsible. This
cardinal principle, barring findings
of guilt for mere association, was
faithfully applied to petitioners and
their enterprise.
In conclusion, respondents believe
that this is not a borderline case.
Petitioners' campaign of hooligan-
ism sets this case far apart from
lawful picketing, leafleting, and civil
rights activity, such as the peaceful
lunch counter sit-ins. Asked to
determine whether petitioners went
beyond protected speech and
beyond mere sit-ins or blockades,
the jury responded affirmatively
by finding dozens of wrongful acts
and threats of force and violence.
As an extra safeguard, the jury was
asked whether any of the predicate
crimes was based on a mere sit-in
or blockade. The jury answered,
"No." These safeguards ensured that
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it was the voluminous and over-
whelming evidence of intentional,
wrongful threats, force, and violence
specifically intended by petitioners
and authorized or ratified by their
enterprise that led to the verdict of
liability.
When properly limited by First
Amendment principles, respondents
say, RICO is a vital tool to combat
nationwide campaigns of terror by
organized groups that target lawful
businesses of whose practices they
disapprove. RICO is particularly
important when the victim is a law-
ful but unpopular business or its
customers and when law enforce-
ment cannot or does not protect
those who, like the clinics
and women in this case, are "espe-
cially vulnerable to the threat of
mob violence."
SIGNIFICANCE
This case is significant on a number
of levels. First, the Supreme Court
must determine what constitutes
''extortion" as a predicate crime
under RICO. More specifically,
extortion under federal and state
law is obtaining one's property with
his consent through the use of
wrongful conduct. The narrow statu-
tory issues are what does it mean to
"obtain" property, what "property"
can be extorted, and what is
"wrongful conduct." The answer to
these questions will define the scope
of RICO.
Second, this case involves political-
protest activity that is the hallmark
of our freedom of expression and
association. The court is asked here
to draw the dividing line between
protected political activity and rack-
eteering activity that violates RICO.
The decision will likely have a pro-
found impact on all future political-
protest activity.
Finally, the remedial scope of RICO
will be determined. Does RICO
authorize the courts to issue an
injunction in favor of a private party
to enjoin future wrongful conduct?
The Supreme Court will decide.
ATTORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For Joseph Scheidler et al. (Alan
Untereiner (202) 775-4500)
For Operation Rescue (Jay Alan
Sekelow (202) 546-8890)
For the National Organization for
Women (Fay Clayton (312) 663-
3100)
AMIcus BRIEFS
In Support of Joseph Scheidler et
al. and Operation Rescue
Alabama (Charles B. Campbell
(334) 242-7300)
Americans United for Life
(Denise M. Burke (312) 492-7234)
Catholic Conference of Illinois et
al. (James C. Geoly (312) 840-7000)
Catholics for Life, Sacramento
(James Joseph Lynch Jr (916) 921-
1988)
Center for Individual Rights
(Michael E. Rosman (202) 833-
8400)
Concerned Women for America
(Theresa Schrempp (206) 275-
2878)
Legal Defense for Unborn
Children (Alan E. Ernest (520) 281-
7513)
Liberty Counsel (Mathew D.
Stayer (407) 875-2100)
Life Legal Defense Foundation
(Andrew W. Zepeda (310) 274-
8700)
National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers (William J.
Mertens (202) 234-9000)
National Right to Work Legal
Defense Foundation (Raymond J.
LaJeuness Jr. (703) 321-8510)
New York Council of Defense
Lawyers (Richard A. Greenberg
(212) 308-7900)
People for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals Inc. (Craig M. Bradley
(812) 855-1257)
American Bar Association
